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one for which all in their own ways advocated, and 
thus all move into different projects disconnected 
to their war-year efforts. The sense one gets is that 
they all give up, with the exception of Weil, who 
had already died by this point (170ff, 190ff). In the 
afterward Jacobs concentrates on Jacques Ellul, and 
the ways in which Ellul moves in a different direction 
from these intellectuals as he thinks about Christian 
life in a post-Christian world. It is hard to know if 
Jacobs is optimistic or pessimistic about the place of 
the Christian intellectual in helping to shape the world 
today. While he lauds his subjects, ultimately he has to 
admit that “they came perhaps a century too late, after 
the reign of technocracy had become so complete that 
none can foresee the end of it while this world lasts” 
(206). And he seems to know, or at least hope, that 
another generation of thinkers will rise and attempt 
to shape the patterns of culture. But he also seems to 
question whether or not they will arise on time, or 
show up too late like these thinkers (206).
Jacobs’ book is well worth a read by anyone 
interested in wrestling with the Christian’s role in 
post-Christian society, those interested in any of 
these literary figures particularly, or even those who 
simply enjoy Jacobs’ prose. One of the most enjoyable 
aspects of this book for me is Jacobs’ readings on a 
variety of texts by these intellectuals. At times, it was 
almost as if I had the opportunity to eavesdrop in a 
Jacobs’ seminar on these writers, and as a result I look 
forward to carving out time to reread many of these 
texts. Alan Jacobs has my thanks for writing this book 
that has shaped my subsequent thinking, teaching, 
and writing.
Understanding Ignorance: The Surprising Impact of What We Don’t Know. Daniel R. DeNicola. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2017. 250 pp. ISBN 978-0-262-03644-3. Reviewed by Dr. Carl P. 
Fictorie, Professor of Chemistry, Dordt University.
In Understanding Ignorance, Daniel DeNicola 
invites us into a paradox, an attempt to understand 
what we don’t know. Early in the book, he 
acknowledges this paradox and confronts possible 
objections to his efforts to understand ignorance: 
“[p]rofessing to write a whole book on ignorance,” he 
says, “reeks of clever irony and invites sarcasm” (10). 
Yet the paradox of the title drew me into reading this 
book. I learned that there is a wealth of knowledge 
about ignorance, and understanding facets of our 
ignorance aids in our understanding our knowledge. 
In this comprehensive but not exhaustive overview, 
DeNicola shows that understanding something 
about ignorance is very helpful to knowledge and 
wisdom.
DeNicola is Professor of Philosophy at Gettysburg 
College, and while the book is philosophical in tone, 
it is not overly technical, so it meets his goal of being 
approachable by a wide range of readers (xii). At the 
same time, the book serves as groundwork for the 
development of a new field of epistemology that 
integrates knowledge and ignorance into a single 
discipline (13, 208). Time will tell whether that goal 
was achieved and whether this field takes hold in 
academic circles.
In the opening chapter, DeNicola provides his 
impetus for studying ignorance. He surveys modern 
Western culture and observes a “tenacious strain of 
anti-intellectualism in American life” (7). Published 
in 2017, Understanding Ignorance was presumably 
written just before or at the start of Donald Trump’s 
term as president, and the author clearly sees and 
laments the era of “fake news” in this larger anti-
intellectual context. It is precisely because of this 
anti-intellectualism that a book such as this is 
needed. DeNicola reminds us that Western culture 
from the time of Socrates has placed great value on 
knowledge while viewing ignorance as a vice (9). As 
we progress through the book, the author argues 
that not all knowledge is good and not all ignorance 
is bad. In fact, understanding ignorance is, for the 
author, necessary if we are to gain knowledge.
A nuanced discussion of two conceptual 
challenges is the subject of the second chapter. First, 
DeNicola describes ignorance as a negative concept, 
one which indicates the absence of something, in this 
case the lack of knowledge (16). This concept can 
become problematic when we try to treat this lack as 
a real entity in and of itself. The author suggests that 
“ignorance implies the capacity to learn,” making 
ignorance a key part of the structure of knowledge 
(18). 
The second conceptual challenge is the paradox 
that to try to understand ignorance must necessarily 
destroy that ignorance with knowledge, the problem 
implied in the title of the book. However, DeNicola 
argues that this is conflating the concept of ignorance 
with the content or subject of that ignorance. It is 
possible to know that one does not know something 
without specifying what that something is (19).
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Having established the possibility of a meaningful 
discussion of ignorance, DeNicola introduces a set of 
four spatial metaphors that become the framework 
for the remainder of the book. Let us look at each of 
these metaphors in turn.
The first metaphor is the notion of ignorance as 
a place (32). Herein we are introduced to two places: 
ignorance as a horrible place that we want to leave by 
entering the place of understanding, and ignorance as 
a place of sweet innocence before we are tainted with 
knowledge of the world. He uses Plato’s Allegory of 
the Cave to illustrate ignorance as a type of hell and 
uses the Garden of Eden to illustrate ignorance as 
a type of heaven. In both places, the occupants are 
unaware of their ignorance, lacking needed self-
knowledge to be aware of their state, and thus they 
require outside intervention to escape. The process 
is irreversible; one cannot return to the cave or the 
garden and lose the knowledge obtained. 
In the context of Plato’s cave, DeNicola concludes 
that since “ignorance may be recognized and ascribed 
only from the perspective of knowledge,” the cave 
dwellers do not know what they do not know and are 
the worse off for it (35-36). The infinite vastness of 
our lack of knowledge is a repeated theme throughout 
the text, one that is intended to keep us intellectually 
humble.
DeNicola next presents ignorance as a state 
of innocence in the context of the Garden of 
Eden. From his perspective, which he describes as 
“provocatively revisionist” (49), the Garden is a 
place of an innocence grounded in Adam and Eve’s 
ignorance of the broader world, and thus the Fall 
“marks the rise of self-consciousness, autonomy, 
and responsibility” (49). That is, the fall is a type of 
epistemic liberation rather than a rebellious act of 
selfishness. As DeNicola proceeds to compare the 
Garden with the Cave, his analysis presumes that 
awareness, experience, and knowledge are innately 
good things. He overlooks the possibility of a sinless 
world where innocence with knowledge is possible. 
The second metaphor is the notion of ignorance 
as a boundary. In this metaphor, the idea of a 
map is the central image—an ancient map such as 
Ptolemy’s from the second century, on which he 
detailed known features of the world but also regions 
that had not yet been discovered, the terra incognita 
or unknown territory (67). Maps show territory, 
but they also show boundaries between different 
places or domains. For DeNicola’s purpose, the 
key boundary is that between the known and the 
unknown: “Ignorance is the domain where learning 
has not yet penetrated” (67). We can articulate, or 
map out, our knowledge, often in the form of a circle 
on a whiteboard. Knowledge is that which is inside 
the circle, while ignorance is that which is outside 
the circle. The sobering aspect of this image is that 
knowledge is bounded and finite, while ignorance is 
unbounded and incomprehensibly vast (69). 
DeNicola does not suggest that seeking knowledge 
is futile (45). It is possible to know something without 
having comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge; 
this in fact may well be the normal state of affairs for 
all our knowledge (71-72). In this context, the author 
surveys several classes of ignorance such as simple 
ignorance that is unintentional, to various kinds of 
intentional ignorance that reflect conscious choices 
by individuals to avoid or withhold knowledge. 
While he acknowledges the appropriate need for 
privacy, he advocates for transparency and criticizes 
secrecy in most other situations (88-91)
In this metaphor of boundary, DeNicola 
introduces ethics into his discussion. Readers of this 
journal will wonder if DeNicola builds his ethical 
framework from a Christian worldview. The answer 
is that no such foundation is evident. Rather, his 
ethical system is grounded in the notion of the innate 
human aspiration to truth (9, 79, 98). His analysis 
begins with the notion of basic belief. Someone who 
has a belief takes that belief to be true. However, 
it is possible that the belief is actually false if not 
adequately justified, and DeNicola suggests that false 
beliefs become morally problematic when the believer 
consciously retains the belief even when shown it is 
false (99). A problem in this logic is that many if not 
all beliefs are held based on limited evidence, which 
can undermine the belief, the ability to believe, or the 
ability to critique a belief.
This point leads to a new chapter exploring the 
virtues and vices of ignorance. DeNicola introduces 
an approach known as virtue epistemology, a method 
that focuses on virtuous traits needed to pursue, 
possess, protect, transmit, and apply knowledge 
(116). A key assumption of epistemology is that 
knowledge is the only epistemic value; knowledge is 
the only end-goal, and as such it is good, a notion 
that DeNicola qualifies. Virtue epistemology 
leads to the position that there ought to be some 
boundaries on our personal or collective knowledge. 
Not all knowledge is inherently good, and thus not 
all ignorance is inherently bad, in DeNicola’s view 
(133). At the same time, he also retains the classic 
notion that being ignorant, the opposite of being 
wise, is not virtuous.
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While boundaries suggest that there is something 
on the other side of the boundary, DeNicola’s third 
metaphor of ignorance as a limit suggests that there 
are also boundaries beyond which there is nothing 
(137-138). The line of inquiry has no further to go, 
or the set of resources has been exhausted. There are 
limits grounded in the finiteness and directionality 
of time, the structural and cognitive nature of our 
biology, and the axiomatic and systemic limits 
of formal and mathematical logic. While some 
have suggested that we are approaching the “end 
of knowledge” (151), DeNicola notes that new 
discoveries likely still exist, given the inexhaustibility 
of factual data that will cause us to reconsider our 
theoretical frameworks in the future. In a brief 
discussion of the possible omniscience of a god, 
he concludes that the implication of omniscience 
for a god is an unstable concept (153). I think he 
fails to recognize that finite humans ought to find 
it impossible to comprehensively understand an 
omniscient god.
The final chapter explores the metaphor of 
ignorance as a horizon in the sense of one’s point of 
view. One can see so far, which is the boundary, but 
when one moves, that horizon moves as well, so the 
boundary is always out of reach (179). His point is 
that it is the interaction of the known and unknown 
that is key to understanding “epistemic aspects of the 
human condition” (180).
We see the effect of moving horizons when we 
learn. New knowledge also generates new questions, 
as any critical thinker understands. As we move to 
learn more, the horizon shifts, and more ignorance 
becomes apparent, as unknown unknowns become 
known unknowns (185). At the same time, the 
awareness of our ignorance is what sparks imagination 
and creativity. The pursuit of knowledge is in fact 
movement into ignorance, a view that resonates with 
my scientifically trained mind (186). 
As he concludes the book, DeNicola’s expertise 
comes to the fore as he articulates his understanding 
of the purpose of philosophy. He writes, “Philosophy 
is not a science: its task is not to assemble and validate 
a set of facts, not even to produce new propositional 
knowledge of the world in a narrow sense….The 
philosopher’s task is, in the first instance, to maintain, 
sustain, and expand our sense of the possible….The 
philosopher is the shepherd of possibilities” (189). He 
notes that philosophy, while it encourages knowledge, 
wisdom, curiosity, and discovery, ultimately 
understands that complete escape from ignorance is 
impossible, just as touching the horizon is impossible. 
In an epilogue, DeNicola delves briefly into the 
technicalities of epistemology. While he acknowledges 
the value of Cartesian-based modern epistemology, he 
argues that epistemology needs to broaden its scope 
to include a grander vision that includes knowledge, 
understanding, and ignorance.
DeNicola returns repeatedly throughout the 
book to the challenge of public ignorance. There 
are different types, from lack of understanding of 
common knowledge (75), irrational beliefs (7), and 
privileged ignorance (113), to the right to believe or 
not believe what one wants (99). It is the last types 
that he criticizes, as it leads to cultural disharmony, 
isolated likeminded groups, and even various kinds 
of violence. His ethics of ignorance, as noted above, 
clearly favors the benefits of knowledge while 
allowing for limited instances of willful, intentional 
ignorance.
DeNicola has written an interesting survey of 
a curious topic. He achieves his goal of writing a 
comprehensive but not exhaustive overview while 
still providing enough depth and many examples 
to illustrate his points. He integrates ideas from a 
wide range of disciplines, many of which are dealing 
with questions of how to manage ignorance. He 
acknowledges a place for ignorance in everyday living 
and in the discipline of epistemology but sees this as 
a necessary qualifier on the traditional notion of the 
inherent value of knowledge in and of itself. While 
we cannot ignore ignorance, we cannot allow it to 
define our knowledge and understanding.
